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Abstract
Consistent with the predictions of Wang (1994), we document that firm-specific informed
trading is an important determinant of price momentum. The stronger return continuation
in stocks with more informed trading cannot be explained by cross-sectional differences
in uncertainty proxies such as analyst forecast dispersion, analyst coverage, idiosyncratic
return volatility, and size. The relationship between informed trading and return continua-
tion is also not attributable to cross-sectional differences in liquidity. Instead, our evidence
emphasizes the role of price discovery in generating short-term price momentum.
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The returns from momentum strategies, as documented in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)
and again by Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), pose a serious challenge to market efficiency. The
robustness of these strategies is confirmed by numerous studies such as Rouwenhorst (1998) and
Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003) that document momentum in international markets. Fama and
French (1993) find market, value, and size factors cannot account for momentum returns, while
Grundy and Martin (2001) report that firm-specific factors are responsible for momentum.
We examine the relationship between informed trading and price momentum. O’Hara (2003)
argues that anomalies such as momentum highlight the need to incorporate informed trading
into asset pricing. Our analysis is motivated by Wang (1994)’s price discovery model with het-
erogeneous investors and asymmetric information. In Wang (1994), informed investors trade
either because of their private information or changes in their investment opportunities that
cause them to initiate uninformed trades. These distinct motives yield different return dynam-
ics. However, from the perspective of uninformed investors, the motives of informed investors
are unpredictable and cannot immediately be identified. Instead, learning allows uninformed
investors to eventually correct their initial assessments regarding the extent to which private
information is responsible for turnover. When uninformed investors ascertain the presence of
private information, they update their cashflow expectations and consequently imitate the ear-
lier trades of informed investors. Thus, provided turnover is motivated by private information,
uninformed investors gradually become informed and influence prices in a manner that causes
return continuation. Conversely, in the absence of private information, turnover leads to subse-
quent reversals. These temporary price impacts compensate uniformed investors for the provision
of liquidity.1 Therefore, return continuation in Wang (1994) requires asymmetric information.
We measure asymmetric information using the probability of informed trading (PIN) in Easley,
Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002). PIN has been utilized extensively as a measure for informed trad-
ing, with the next section providing a detailed summary of its estimation and previous empirical
applications. Recently, Ferreira and Laux (2007) confirm that firms with better corporate gov-
ernance have more informative stock prices using the PIN estimates in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and
O’Hara (2002). PIN is also well suited for testing the predictions of Wang (1994). In the PIN
methodology, good private information causes informed investors to initiate buy trades while
1This compensation accounts for the likelihood of trading against private information. However, a risk premium
for informed trading is insufficient to generate return continuation.
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bad private information causes them to initiate sell trades. The buy and sell imbalances arising
from private information increase PIN. Conversely, uninformed trades lower PIN.
We document a strong cross-sectional relationship between return continuation and informed
trading using the PIN estimates in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002). This relationship
is studied using individual stocks returns during several non-overlapping horizons, including an
intermediate horizon over the prior twelve months (excluding the most recent month). This
intermediate horizon corresponds to the formation period of momentum strategies.2 Our cross-
sectional regressions incorporate a firm-specific interaction variable defined by PIN and past
returns over the intermediate horizon. This interaction variable predicts future returns in every
regression specification. Moreover, the predictability associated with past intermediate returns
is eliminated by the introduction of the PIN interaction variable.
As predicted by Wang (1994), the high turnover stocks exhibiting return continuation are
those with high PIN. In contrast, high turnover stocks with low PIN exhibit return reversals.
Intuitively, uninformed investors are more likely to learn that turnover is being motivated by pri-
vate information in high PIN stocks. This learning generates return continuation as uninformed
investors update their cashflow expectations and imitate the earlier trades of informed investors.
Conversely, private information is less likely to be motivating turnover in low PIN stocks. With
less informed trading, high turnover leads to subsequent return reversals. Avramov, Chordia,
and Goyal (2006) also conclude that return reversals are attributable to liquidity shocks. Their
evidence on weekly return reversals indicates that the price impact of uninformed trades has a
shorter duration than the monthly horizons in our empirical study.3
As reported in Zhang (2006), firm characteristics that proxy for uncertainty such as size and
analyst coverage are negatively related to momentum returns, while analyst forecast dispersion
and return volatility are positively related to momentum returns. Zhang (2006) interprets these
associations as evidence that behavioral biases influence stock prices after assuming that limits to
arbitrage are greater in stocks with higher uncertainty. However, including size, analyst coverage,
2We study return continuation in individual stocks using cross-sectional regressions as well as the returns from
zero-cost momentum trading strategies using double-sorted portfolios.
3Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002) document that periods of intense trading activity result in daily
return continuation for stocks with high informed trading. However, our study focuses on monthly horizons and
controls for uncertainty and liquidity characteristics in the existing momentum literature.
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analyst forecast dispersion, and idiosyncratic return volatility in our cross-sectional regressions
does not alter the relationship between PIN and return continuation. Furthermore, our results
provide stronger support for Wang (1994)’s explanation of return continuation than behavioral
biases. Despite exhibiting stronger short-term momentum, high PIN stocks have weaker long-
term return reversals. This evidence indicates that an overreaction to private information is not
responsible for short-term price momentum.
More generally, behavioral finance relies on limits to arbitrage to prevent arbitrageurs from
eliminating mispricings caused by investor psychology. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue these
limits originate from the risk posed by noise traders. In contrast, we report stronger momentum
in high PIN stocks that, by definition, have lower noise trader risk. Moreover, the uncertainty
proxies are related to informed trading. Aslan, Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2007) report that
size and analyst coverage are negatively related to PIN. Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens (1998)
attribute a portion of analyst forecast dispersion to disagreement arising from private informa-
tion, while Wang (1993) demonstrates that asymmetric information increases return volatility.
Thus, the association between greater uncertainty and stronger momentum is compatible with
informed trading being the origin of return continuation.
Several studies conclude that momentum strategies involve stocks with high transaction costs
(Grundy and Martin (2001), Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou (2003), as well as Korajczyk and Sadka
(2004)). Nonetheless, the relationship between PIN and return continuation remains after includ-
ing effective spreads and estimates for Kyle (1985)’s lambda in our cross-sectional regressions.
Furthermore, wider effective spreads and larger price impacts arise from increases in asymmetric
information. Consequently, by increasing the transaction costs confronting arbitrageurs, in-
formed trading offers a potential explanation for momentum’s persistence.4 Keim (2003) reports
that institutional transaction costs are higher for momentum investors than value investors and
diversified investors.
For emphasis, our intention is not to dispute the importance of uncertainty and liquidity to
momentum returns. Instead, we complement prior findings by offering an alternative interpre-
tation for their importance. Our interpretation recognizes the commonality between proxies for
informed trading, uncertainty, and liquidity. Furthermore, by appealing to Wang (1994), the
4This paper focuses on the ability of informed trading to explain the existence of momentum returns before
transaction costs.
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interaction between informed trading and turnover guides our interpretation.
As a robustness test, we regress PIN on the complete set of uncertainty and liquidity proxies
as well as order flow imbalances during the holding period. The residuals from this cross-sectional
regression represent residual probabilities of informed trading (RPIN) that are independent of the
other firm characteristics. These RPIN estimates confirm that the relationship between informed
trading and return continuation is not attributable to cross-sectional differences in uncertainty,
liquidity, and order flow imbalances.
To complement the cross-sectional regressions and explicitly study their implications for mo-
mentum returns, double-sorted portfolios are constructed that first sort firms according to an
uncertainty, liquidity, or order flow imbalance characteristic. The second sort creates PIN port-
folios within each of the individual firm characteristic portfolios. Momentum returns across these
double-sorted portfolios consistently increase with informed trading. Indeed, momentum returns
are insignificant in the low PIN portfolio and significant in the high PIN portfolio, irrespective of
the firm characteristic in the first sort. Double-sorted portfolios also confirm that a combination
of high turnover and high informed trading produces the strongest momentum.
The remainder of this paper begins in Section I by detailing the data used in our empirical
tests. Section II then presents our empirical evidence regarding the importance of informed
trading to return continuation, while the relationship between informed trading and momentum
is examined in Section III. The economic implications of time variation in informed trading is
examined in Section IV. The interpretation of our empirical results is contained in Section V,
with our conclusions following in Section VI.
I Data and Summary Statistics
We measure informed trading using the probability of informed trading (PIN) estimates in Easley,
Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002). This metric originates from order flow data and represents
the percentage of trades initiated by informed investors. Intuitively, informed investors are
responsible for buy and sell imbalances, which originate from good and bad private information
respectively. More formally, each trading day has either good, bad, or no private information.
This classification requires two parameters. The first parameter denotes the probability of private
information, while the second parameter denotes the probability that this private information
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is bad (good). These probabilities are estimated from the frequency of large daily order flow
imbalances since private information leads to buy and sell imbalances on days with good and
bad private information respectively. These informed buy and sell orders are executed with the
same intensity. Conversely, uninformed buy and sell orders arrive with different intensities, and
are not attributable to private information. A maximum likelihood procedure estimates the five
required parameters (two probabilities and three intensities) from the number of daily buy and
sell trades.
The likelihood function underlying the estimation of PIN is a mixture of three distributions,
each corresponding to a different type of trading day (good, bad, or no private information). The
probability of informed trading is then defined as a ratio whose numerator equals the probability
of private information multiplied by the intensity of informed trading. This product also appears
in the ratio’s denominator along with the buy and sell intensities of uninformed trades. Therefore,
PIN measures the relative amount of informed trading.
The ability of PIN to measure informed trading is confirmed in several studies. Easley, Kiefer,
and O’Hara (1996) modify PIN to allow trades to be routed through either the NYSE or the
Cincinnati Stock Exchange. This modified PIN indicates significantly more informed trading
on the NYSE since uninformed order flow is purchased and executed in Cincinnati. A simpler
version of PIN enables Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paperman (1996) to study infrequently traded
stocks by restricting the buy and sell intensities of uninformed investors to be equal. Although
PIN and spreads are derived from order flow and prices respectively, this four parameter version
of PIN predicts spreads. Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1997) extend PIN to distinguish between
small and large trades. They find that trade size is not highly informative, a property that
reinforces the appropriateness of the PIN specification in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002).
Our primary sample consists of NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks with available PIN estimates,
starting from January 1983 and ending in December 2001. This PIN dataset is then merged with
CRSP. Throughout this sample period, an average of 2,191 firms have annual PIN estimates.
Extending the PIN dataset beyond 2001 is complicated by the classification of trades as buyer-
initiated versus seller-initiated since narrower spreads can compromise the accuracy of the Lee
and Ready (1991) algorithm.
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A. Uncertainty and Liquidity
The momentum literature has examined the contribution of uncertainty to momentum returns.
Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005) as well as Zhang (2006) argue that limits to arbitrage are more
severe in stocks with greater cashflow uncertainty. These authors presume that larger analyst
forecast dispersion and higher idiosyncratic return volatility signify greater uncertainty. Small
stocks and those with less analyst coverage are also assumed to have more uncertain future cash-
flows. Therefore, when evaluating the marginal contribution of PIN to momentum, we control
for size, analyst coverage, analyst forecast dispersion, and return R2. These four uncertainty
proxies are computed each month although they are highly persistent.
Analyst forecast dispersion and analyst coverage are obtained from the IBES database. Ana-
lyst coverage equals the number of analysts covering the stock each month, while analyst forecast
dispersion is defined as the monthly standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts for the
next fiscal year divided by the stock price. As in prior empirical studies, we estimate a stock’s
return R2 by regressing its weekly return on the return of its industry and the market. Indus-
tries are classified according to the 48 categories available on Kenneth French’s website. This
regression utilizes weekly returns over the past 52 weeks, where these returns are defined as the
compounded daily returns between two consecutive Wednesdays.
Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) demonstrate the ability of systematic liquidity fluctuations to
capture variation in momentum returns. To ensure that our results regarding informed trading
and momentum are not attributable to cross-sectional differences in liquidity, we consider two
liquidity characteristics. The first proxy consists of a linear price-impact coefficient, which par-
allels Kyle (1985)’s lambda over the January 1989 to December 2001 horizon, while the second
proxy is the effective spread. The effective spread and Kyle (1985)’s lambda are estimated from
transaction and quote data (TAQ). The effective spread equals twice the absolute difference
between a trade’s execution price and the prevailing midquote divided by this midquote. To
estimate lambda, buy and sell orders are aggregated at the daily level to obtain firm-specific
order flow imbalances after classifying trades using the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. The
lambda proxy is estimated as the coefficient from regressing daily stock returns on these daily
imbalances. As with the effective spread, these estimated regression coefficients are averaged
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across each calendar year.5
B. Summary Statistics
Table I contains averages and correlations for the firm characteristics in our study. Panel A
reports these averages across five PIN quintiles, with P1 denoting the low PIN portfolio and
P5 denoting the high PIN portfolio. Panel B records the annual correlations between the firm
characteristics.
Consistent with Aslan, Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2007), informed trading is more preva-
lent in small stocks and stocks with less analyst coverage, while the inverse relationship between
return R2 and PIN implies that stocks with a lower return R2 have more informative prices.6
Larger analyst forecast dispersions in high PIN stocks is consistent with Barron, Kim, Lim, and
Stevens (1998)’s decomposition of analyst forecast dispersion into uncertainty and disagreement
components, with the latter arising from private information.
In contrast to size, analyst coverage, analyst forecast dispersion, and the effective spread,
PIN is estimated with error. Nonetheless, asymmetric information is capable of unifying several
prior empirical regularities regarding momentum since higher uncertainty and lower liquidity
both coincide with greater informed trading. Although there is no pattern in turnover across the
PIN portfolios, the next section examines the interaction between PIN and turnover in detail.
The time series standard deviation of the PIN estimates for individual firms averages 0.05 over
the sample period, in comparison to the average PIN estimate of 0.22. Furthermore, the average
autocorrelation in the PIN estimates equals 0.27. The economic implications of predictability in
informed trading is examined in Section IV. Variables such as size and analyst coverage exhibit
less time series variation and are more persistent.
5Replacing lambda with Amihud (2002)’s price-impact measure yields similar unreported results. The illiq-
uidity measure in Amihud (2002) does not involve transactions data since this ratio is defined as a firm’s absolute
daily return divided by its corresponding dollar-denominated turnover.
6In the absence of asymmetric information, Peng, and Xiong (2006) argue that a low return R2 (high idiosyn-
cratic volatility) signifies overconfidence. However, Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000), Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and
Zarowin (2003), as well as Li and Myers (2005) conclude that firms with a low return R2’s have more informative
prices since their returns are less correlated with those of the market and their industry.
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II Informed Trading and Return Continuation
The importance of informed trading to return continuation is evaluated using an interaction
variable. This variable is defined as the product of PIN estimates with past returns over an
intermediate horizon corresponding to the formation period of momentum strategies. Several
specifications of the following Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression involving monthly individual
stock returns are estimated
ri,t = β0 + β1 ln (Size)i,t−1 + β2BMi,t−1 + β3 ri,t−1,t + β4 ri,t−12,t−2 + β5 ri,t−60,t−13 (1)
+β6 [PINi,t∗ · ri,t−12,t−2] + β7
[
Dispi,t−1 · ri,t−12,t−2
]
+ β8 [Lambdai,t∗ · ri,t−12,t−2] + i,t ,
where t is a mean-zero error term and t
∗ denotes the calendar year containing month t. The
rt−1,t and rt−60,t−13 variables account for short-term (prior month) and long-term return reversals
respectively. The interaction with intermediate past returns denoted rt−12,t−2 is required for
PIN, forecast dispersion (Disp), and lambda to capture the return continuation associated with
momentum.7
A firm’s market capitalization is measured each month to provide the size and book-to-market
(BM) variables. Equation (1) uses analyst forecast dispersion in month t−1 although the results
are nearly identical with month t values due to its persistence. Furthermore, our conclusions
are unchanged if forecast dispersion and lambda are replaced with other uncertainty proxies
(analyst coverage or return R2) and the effective spread respectively. Additional interaction
variables induce multicollinearity given their common dependence on past returns over the inter-
mediate horizon. We simultaneously account for the effects of multiple uncertainty and liquidity
characteristics later in this section.
Recall that PIN, along with lambda and the effective spread, are estimated over annual
calendar-time horizons. Thus, PINt∗ is often estimated over time intervals that overlap with past
intermediate returns. This overlap is inconsequential to our cross-sectional analysis, although
PIN estimates from the prior calendar year are investigated in Section IV to assess the learning
motivation in Wang (1994).8
7Regressing future returns on PIN is closer to Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002)’s study regarding a risk
premium for informed trading.
8As emphasized in Section IV, there is no attempt to formulate a viable trading trading strategy when testing
a learning model.
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The different specifications of equation (1) are estimated by omitting one or more of the last
three variables corresponding to the β6, β7, and β8 coefficients. These specifications enable us to
examine the importance of informed trading to return continuation after accounting for analyst
forecast dispersion and lambda.
The estimated coefficients from equation (1) are recorded in Table II. In all specifications,
the β1 coefficient for size and β2 coefficient for book-to-market are insignificant after controlling
for past returns. For emphasis, regression coefficients involving the entire cross-section of returns
and firm characteristics, as in equation (1), differ from the loadings on factor returns. Returns
from book-to-market, size, and liquidity factors are utilized in the next section to risk-adjust
momentum returns.
Model 1 reveals a positive β4 coefficient of 0.0063 (t-statistic of 2.16) for rt−12,t−2. Thus, past
returns over intermediate horizons predict future returns. Conversely, the β3 and β5 coefficients
are both negative, which is consistent with return reversals over the short-term (prior month)
and long-term respectively, although β5 is insignificant in every specification.
More importantly, in model 2, the interaction variable involving informed trading has a
significant β6 coefficient of 0.0895 (t-statistic of 3.60) that renders the β4 coefficient for rt−12,t−2
insignificant (t-statistic of -1.42). Thus, the interaction between informed trading and past
intermediate returns is responsible for return continuation. Indeed, the β4 coefficient for past
intermediate returns is insignificant (and negative) in every specification that includes the PINt∗ ·
rt−12,t−2 interaction variable.
The economic significance of the β6 coefficient can be interpreted by considering a change in
PIN. Conditional on rt−12,t−2, an increase in PIN by 0.01 increases returns in the holding period
by β6 · 0.01. With the average β6 coefficient in Table II being slightly below 0.10, every 0.01
increase in PIN implies the monthly holding period return is 0.001 ·rt−12,t−2 higher, which implies
an annual increase exceeding 0.01 · rt−12,t−2. Recall that the standard deviation of PIN, at the
individual firm level, averages 0.05. Thus, a two standard deviation increase in PIN increases
annual holding period returns by more than 10% of the formation period’s return.
Models 3 and 4 indicate that the interaction variables involving analyst dispersion and lambda
have insignificant β7 and β8 coefficients. Therefore, after controlling for past returns, uncertainty
and liquidity cannot explain return continuation. Instead, the significant β6 coefficients in models
5, 6, and 7 for the PINt∗ ·rt−12,t−2 interaction variable confirm the importance of informed trading
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to return continuation.
A. Turnover
In Wang (1994), a combination of informed trading and high turnover produces return continua-
tion. Without informed trading, high turnover induces a liquidity shock that subsequently leads
to return reversals rather than return continuation. To investigate these empirical predictions,
we perform the following cross-sectional regression
ri,t = β0 + β1 ln (Size)i,t−1 + β2BMi,t−1 + β3 ri,t−1,t + β4 ri,t−12,t−2 + β5 ri,t−60,t−13 (2)
+β6 [∆TOi · ri,t−12,t−2] + i,t ,
within PIN portfolios. With the predictions of Wang (1994) pertaining to increases in turnover,
high turnover is determined on a firm-specific basis. The ∆TO variable is defined as a firm’s
turnover in month t− 1 relative to its turnover during the intermediate past return horizon from
month t− 12 to month t− 2. Double-sorted portfolios in the next section condition on the level
of turnover, as in Lee and Swaminathan (2000)’s momentum study.
As reported in Table III, the β6 coefficients for the interaction variable ∆TO · rt−12,t−2 across
the PIN portfolios are consistent with the predictions of Wang (1994). In particular, the low PIN
portfolio has a negative coefficient, indicating return reversals, while the high PIN portfolio has
a positive coefficient. More importantly, the difference between the β6 coefficients of the high
PIN and low PIN portfolios, 0.0129, is significant (t-statistic of 2.24). Indeed, only β3 and β6 are
significantly different in the low PIN portfolio versus the high PIN portfolio. The 0.0308 disparity
(t-statistic of 3.14) between the β3 coefficients indicates that short-term return reversals are less
pronounced in high PIN stocks. Consequently, stocks with more informed trading experience
weaker short-term return reversals.
Although informed investors are inactive when they do not posses private information or
when their investment opportunities have not changed, these inactive periods can be infrequent.
Consequently, provided informed investors trade regularly, the influence of informed trading on
return continuation is expected to dominate turnover’s influence. For example, when asymmet-
ric information is time-varying, constant turnover does not reduce the uncertainty surrounding
informed trading from the perspective of uninformed investors. This uncertainty is of primary im-
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portance when distinguishing between return continuation and return reversals in Wang (1994)’s
learning model.
B. Order Flow Imbalances and Residual Informed Trading
To alleviate concerns that cumulative order flow imbalances are responsible for return continua-
tion and determining the PIN estimates, we investigate order flow imbalances during the holding
period. These order flow imbalances are negatively correlated with PIN, while the correlation be-
tween PIN and the absolute value of order flow imbalances equals 0.237.9 Besides being positively
correlated with PIN, the absolute value accounts for the impact of large negative imbalances on
the returns from short-selling past losers. These two properties imply that the absolute value of
order flow imbalances is more relevant to our momentum study.
The correlation between PIN and the volatility of daily order flow imbalances equals 0.618.
This high correlation is intuitive since an alternating sequence of large positive and large negative
daily order flow imbalances result in a high PIN, while the cumulative order flow imbalance of
this sequence may be near zero. Conversely, a series of small order flow imbalances with the
same sign creates a large cumulative imbalance but a low PIN. Hence, PIN and the volatility
of order flow imbalances both depend on the frequency of large daily imbalances (irrespective of
their sign) more than cumulative imbalances.
We construct residual probabilities of information trading (RPIN) each month that simul-
taneously account for multiple uncertainty and liquidity characteristics as well as order flow
imbalances. RPIN estimates are obtained each month from the following cross-sectional regres-
sion
PINi,t = γ0 + γ1Dispi,t + γ2Covi,t + γ3 R
2
i,t + γ4 ln (Size)i,t
+γ5 Lambdai,t + γ6 ESi,t + γ7 |OIB|i,t + νi,t . (3)
The Cov and ES variables denote analyst coverage and the effective spread respectively, while
|OIB| refers to the absolute value of order flow imbalances.10 The combination of intercepts and
9Annual order flow imbalances that coincide with the estimation of PIN are also examined. However, annual
imbalances are virtually independent of momentum returns and have a far weaker correlation with PIN.
10PIN, lambda, and the effective spread are constant within each calendar year, while the remaining variables
are computed monthly. Persistence in forecast dispersion, analyst coverage, return R2, and size leads to similar
12
residuals in equation (3) represent firm-specific residual probabilities of informed trading, with
RPINi defined as γ0 + νi.
Three different nested specifications of equation (3) are estimated. The first specification is
limited to uncertainty (γ5, γ6, and γ7 are zero), and produces RPIN1 residuals. The second
specification yields RPIN2 residuals by examining the influence of uncertainty and liquidity on
informed trading (γ7 is zero), while RPIN3 residuals account for uncertainty, liquidity, and the
absolute value of order flow imbalances.
The three sets of RPIN estimates from equation (3) are incorporated into an interaction
variable RPINt ·rt−12,t−2 that parallels its earlier counterpart defined by PINt∗ . We then estimate
a special case of equation (1)
ri,t = β0 + β1 ln (Size)i,t−1 + β2BMi,t−1 + β3 ri,t−1,t + β4 ri,t−12,t−2 + β5 ri,t−60,t−13 (4)
+β6 [RPINi,t · ri,t−12,t−2] + i,t ,
since cross-sectional differences in uncertainty are incorporated into all three RPIN estimates,
while cross-sectional differences in liquidity are incorporated in RPIN2 and RPIN3.
Table IV reports significant β6 coefficients for each of the three RPIN specifications. A slight
decline in β6 from 0.2010 to 0.1658 accompanies the addition of liquidity proxies and the absolute
value of order flow imbalances to equation (3). Thus, the influence of informed trading on return
continuation is not attributable to uncertainty, liquidity, nor order flow imbalances.
Adding the interaction variable |OIB |t·rt−12,t−2 to equation (1) does not reduce the magnitude
nor the significance of the PINt∗ · rt−12,t−2 interaction variable. While significantly positive, the
coefficient for the |OIB |t · rt−12,t−2 interaction variable is difficult to interpret. A combination
of autocorrelation in monthly order flow imbalances in conjunction with the high correlation
between contemporaneous order flow imbalances and returns can explain its significance.11
C. Existing Empirical Evidence
Jackson and Johnson (2006) report that momentum is concentrated in firms experiencing corpo-
rate events such as mergers and acquisitions that alter expected cashflows. These events likely
results when equation (3) is estimated using their averages over every calendar year.
11Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) document that order flow imbalances over short horizons predict returns,
causing positive and then subsequently negative return autocorrelation.
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stimulate informed trading. Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2007) find stronger mo-
mentum in stocks with lower credit ratings, while Odders-White and Ready (2005) report that
firms with lower credit ratings have more informed trading. When combined, informed trading
can explain the stronger return continuation in stocks with lower credit ratings. Intuitively, firms
on a credit-watch are likely to be closely monitored by debtholders, customers, suppliers, and
other stakeholders willing to trade on their private information.
Hvidkjaer (2006) finds the impact of small trade imbalances on returns is more pronounced
for stocks with high turnover. Provided uninformed investors execute small trades and gradually
learn about the presence of informed trading, small trade imbalances reflect private information
that was previously known by informed investors. Thus, the results in Hvidkjaer (2006) are
consistent with uninformed investors becoming informed.
The empirical results in Liang (2006) confirm that stocks with higher PIN measures exhibit
stronger momentum across the sixteen strategies in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). However,
there are several theoretical differences between the models of Liang (2006) and Wang (1994)
that yield distinct testable implications. In Liang (2006), the motivation underlying trades by
informed investors is not uncertain. Instead, as private information is revealed, uninformed
investors trade against informed investors rather than imitating their prior trades. This conflict
culminates has informed investors becoming contrarian. In addition, Liang (2006) does not
examine the interaction between informed trading and turnover.
III Momentum Implications
We form double-sorted portfolios to examine the influence of informed trading on momentum
returns. The interaction between turnover and PIN on momentum returns is also investigated,
along with controls for uncertainty and liquidity characteristics as well as order flow imbalances.
As in Zhang (2006) and Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2006), a 12-1-1 momentum strategy with a
twelve month formation period and a one month holding period is examined with a one month
interval inserted between these periods. Similar results are obtained from an alternative 6-1-6
momentum strategy with six month formation and holding periods. The monthly stock returns
underlying these momentum strategies are obtained from CRSP. Value-weighted momentum
returns are examined for completeness since cross-sectional regressions implicitly equally-weight
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each firm.
A. Turnover
We begin by double-sorting stocks into portfolios according to their PIN and their turnover
during the last month of the formation period. Lee and Swaminathan (2000)’s momentum study
also examines the level of turnover. They find that stocks with high turnover have stronger
momentum, but interpret turnover as a proxy for investor sentiment.
Table V reports that stocks in the P4-TO4 portfolio with high turnover and high PIN have the
strongest momentum amongst all the double-sorted portfolios, 2.41% on average (t-statistic of
3.66). However, as predicted by Wang (1994), high turnover does not imply stronger momentum
unless accompanied by high informed trading.12 Indeed, stocks in the P1-T04 portfolio with high
turnover and low PIN exhibit return reversals, albeit insignificant, averaging -0.54% (t-statistic of
-1.03). This negative return is the lowest amongst all the double-sorted portfolios. The weaker
evidence of return reversals, in comparison to return continuation, may be attributed to our
holding period beginning one month after the formation period. Jegadeesh (1990) documents
return reversals in individual stocks within monthly horizons, while Avramov, Chordia, and
Goyal (2006) conclude that weekly return reversals are induced by liquidity shocks.
Adjusting the monthly returns of individual stocks for market, book-to-market, and size
factors along with the liquidity factor in Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) does not alter our con-
clusions as risk-adjusted momentum returns continue to increase across the PIN portfolios.13
Replacing Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003)’s liquidity factor with its counterpart in Sadka (2006)
yields similar empirical results.
The reverse double-sorts also demonstrate the importance of informed trading. In unreported
12Quartiles ensure there are sufficient stocks available to compute momentum returns after sorting stocks
according to their PIN, turnover, and past returns. With quartiles for PIN and turnover, the sorting procedure
underlying Table V involves computing unadjusted and risk-adjusted returns for 80 portfolios; 4 PIN portfolios
times 4 turnover portfolios times 5 past return portfolios. PIN and turnover quintiles would involve 125 portfolios,
each containing very few stocks. Quintiles are investigated in Table VI since portfolio returns are only computed
for 25 portfolios.
13Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) demonstrate that their liquidity factor accounts for a substantial component
of momentum over annual horizons. However, over monthly horizons, returns from their liquidity factor are far
more variable than momentum returns.
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results, after stocks are first sorted into turnover quartiles, those with the highest PIN exhibit
the strongest momentum while low PIN stocks exhibit return reversals.
B. Firm Characteristics
We also double-sort stocks into PIN quintiles after accounting for their uncertainty and liquid-
ity characteristics. These double-sorted portfolios are constructed sequentially to ensure each
portfolio contains the same number of stocks.14
To create size-neutralized portfolios, stocks are first sorted into size quintiles. The five low
PIN portfolios are then combined across each of the size quintiles, and summarized as P1. This
combination of PIN quintiles, within size portfolios, is then conducted to form the P2 through
P5 portfolios. This procedure is also applied to the remaining uncertainty proxies as well as the
effective spread, lambda, and order flow imbalances.
After controlling for size, Panel A of Table VI reports that momentum continues to increase
with informed trading, from an insignificant 0.28% (t-statistic of 0.78) in the low PIN portfolio
to 1.19% (t-statistic of 2.77) in the high PIN portfolio. Furthermore, the relationship between
momentum and PIN cannot be attributed to analyst forecast dispersion. Specifically, within the
dispersion-neutralized portfolios, momentum increases with informed trading, from an insignif-
icant 0.15% (t-statistic of 0.42) in the P1 portfolio to a highly significant 1.54% (t-statistic of
3.73) in the P5 portfolio. Unreported analyst coverage and return R2 results are nearly identical.
Cross-sectional differences in Kyle (1985)’s lambda also cannot explain the relationship between
between momentum and informed trading. For example, within lambda-neutralized portfolios,
momentum returns are increasing with PIN, from 0.17% (t-statistic of 0.38) in the P1 portfolio
to 1.44% (t-statistic of 2.26) in the P5 portfolio. A similar unreported pattern is observed after
controlling for effective spreads.
Panel A of Table VI also demonstrates that momentum returns increase across the PIN
portfolios after accounting for the absolute value of order flow imbalances. Indeed, momentum
returns of 2.02% in the P5 portfolio are more than double those in the P4 portfolio, and far more
significant, while stocks with less informed trading exhibit insignificant momentum.
Reverse double-sorts that first classify stocks into PIN quintiles and then additional firm
14An independent sort yields too many large (too few small) stocks with low informed trading.
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characteristics are also evaluated. In unreported results, there is no pattern in momentum
returns across the size, forecast dispersion, analyst coverage, return R2, lambda, effective spread,
and order flow imbalance portfolios after accounting for informed trading.
To simultaneously account for uncertainty and liquidity characteristics as well as order flow
imbalances, residual probabilities of informed trading are examined. After estimating the regres-
sion in equation (3), stocks are sorted into RPIN quintiles according to their residuals. Even
without accounting for turnover, the results in Panel B of Table VI confirm that momentum
returns are monotonically increasing from 0.21% in the low RPIN portfolio to 1.09% in the high
RPIN portfolio.
IV Prior PIN
In Wang (1994), uninformed investors are initially uncertain about the motives of informed
investors. However, if informed trading is highly predictable, then less uncertainty surrounds
informed trading. We investigate PIN estimates from the prior calendar year to assess the
economic implications of time-varying asymmetric information in terms of return continuation.15
This variability is not required to justify a risk premium for informed trading but is crucial for
testing the learning motivation in Wang (1994). For emphasis, from the perspective of uninformed
investors, uncertainty regarding the motivation of informed investors does not correspond with
PIN being either high or low.16 Instead, a weak relationship between prior PIN estimates and
return continuation is consistent with the level of asymmetric information being uncertain.
Prior PIN is denoted PINt∗−1 where t∗ − 1 refers to the calendar year before the month t
holding period. To test the relationship between prior PIN and return continuation, we study the
interaction variable PINt∗−1 · rt−12,t−2. Both elements of PINt∗−1 · rt−12,t−2 are constructed before
the holding period in month t. With PIN estimated over annual calendar-time horizons, the
intermediate past return horizon rt−12,t−2 often coincides with the estimation period underlying
PINt∗−1 as well as PINt∗ . Nonetheless, overlap in the rt−12,t−2 component of these interaction
variables is inconsequential to our analysis of informed trading.
15We thank Jiang Wang for clarifying the importance of time series variation in the PIN estimates.
16If uninformed investors know the true level of informed trading, stock prices adjust rapidly with little return
continuation in a high PIN environment, while price impacts are limited in a low PIN environment.
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Two cross-sectional regressions are performed. The first replaces the interaction variable in
equation (1) with PINt∗−1 · rt−12,t−2. As reported in Panel A of Table VII, the coefficient for
PINt∗−1 · rt−12,t−2 equals 0.0026 and is insignificant (t-statistic of 0.12), even without control-
ling for forecast dispersion and lambda. This finding supports the economic intuition in Wang
(1994). Indeed, a strong relationship between prior PIN estimates and return continuation would
undermine the need for learning.
The second cross-sectional regression investigates the interaction variable defined by PINt∗−1
and PINt∗ simultaneously. The inclusion of PINt∗−1 · rt−12,t−2 in equation (1) does not eliminate
the significance of the original interaction variable defined by PINt∗ . Furthermore, the coefficient
of 0.1272 for PINt∗ ·rt−12,t−2 differs from the -0.0060 coefficient for PINt∗−1·rt−12,t−2. The disparity
between these interaction variable coefficients further highlights the economic significance of time
variation in the PIN estimates.
Double-sorted portfolios are also constructed to investigate the ability of prior PIN estimates
to generate stronger momentum returns. In particular, Wang (1994)’s learning model does not
imply the existence of more profitable momentum trading strategies. Nonetheless, autocorre-
lation in the firm-specific PIN estimates averages 0.27. This predictability can undermine the
need for learning to reduce uncertainty if higher momentum returns are available from simply
conditioning on prior PIN estimates and past returns.
Panel B of Table VII documents that significant momentum returns are limited to stocks in
the three highest prior PIN quintiles, while momentum returns in the bottom two prior PIN quin-
tiles are insignificant. This evidence suggests that higher momentum returns are available after
conditioning momentum strategies on prior PIN estimates. However, size eliminates the marginal
importance of prior PIN to momentum returns.17 Replacing size with firm characteristics such as
analyst forecast dispersion yields similar results. Therefore, although the uncertainty proxies are
related to informed trading, momentum investors cannot rely on predictability in firm-specific
PIN estimates to earn higher returns. This result supports the economic intuition in Wang (1994)
as learning is required to overcome uncertainty regarding asymmetric information.
17The size-neutralized portfolios are constructed using the same procedure as those in Panel A of Table VI.
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V Discussion and Implications
To our knowledge, we are the first to document the importance of informed trading to short-term
return continuation. This relationship has important implications for explaining the existence of
momentum and its continued persistence.
A. Rational Interpretation
Our empirical evidence supports the predictions of Wang (1994)’s price discovery model as return
continuation is strongest for stocks with a combination of high turnover and high informed
trading. Conversely, stocks with high turnover and low informed trading fail to exhibit return
continuation. This finding contradicts Lee and Swaminathan (2000)’s interpretation of turnover
as a proxy for investor sentiment.
In the absence of informed trading, Lewellen and Shanken (2002) demonstrate that cash-
flow uncertainty can generate return predictability as a result of learning. However, our results
indicate that asymmetric information is crucial to return continuation. Thus, our findings con-
firm Hong and Stein (1999)’s insight regarding the importance of investor heterogeneity and
asymmetric information to return continuation.
Furthermore, momentum returns have almost zero net exposure to informed trading since
the past winner and past loser portfolios have nearly identical average PIN estimates.18 As a
consequence, a risk factor for informed trading cannot capture the importance of asymmetric in-
formation to momentum returns. Exposure to systematic liquidity also differs from the influence
of firm-specific asymmetric information since time series variation in PIN does not necessarily
induce systematic liquidity fluctuations. Empirically, the P1 and P5 portfolio have average PIN
measures that exhibit little variation over time.
B. Behavioral Interpretation
The informed investor in Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) overreacts to private
signals due to their overconfidence. The representativeness bias in Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny
18Within the high PIN portfolio, the average PIN of past losers and past winners equal 0.295 and 0.292
respectively. Within the low PIN portfolio, the average PIN of past losers is 0.125, while past winners have an
average PIN of 0.120.
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(1998) also induces an overreaction. In these behavioral models, long-term return reversals are
the consequence of investor overreaction.
Figure 1 plots the long-term value-weighted momentum returns across PIN quintiles.19 Stocks
with higher informed trading experience weaker return reversals after stronger momentum. Thus,
Figure 1 suggests that momentum is not caused by investor overreactions. George and Hwang
(2004) also report that momentum and reversals occur in different subsets of stocks. We extend
their results by demonstrating the role of informed trading in separating these subsets.
By allowing investor psychology to create persistent mispricings, the limits to arbitrage as-
sumption is the cornerstone of behavioral finance. The limits to arbitrage argument in Shleifer
and Vishny (1997) is motivated by the presence of noise traders (and agency costs). PIN mea-
sures the percentage of trades that are motivated by private information, with noise trading
being more prevalent in low PIN stocks. Indeed, a higher percentage of informed trades reduces
the percentage of noise trades. Our empirical results document stronger return continuation in
high PIN stocks, which contradicts the limits to arbitrage prediction that this anomaly is due to
the presence of noise traders. Brav and Heaton (2006) also cast doubt on the standard limits to
arbitrage explanation for momentum.
In summary, our results stress the need to consider information-based trading as a source of
momentum in future theoretical as well as empirical research.
C. Persistence of Momentum
Our empirical results indicate that informed trading determines momentum returns before trans-
action costs. Informed trading also contributes to our understanding of momentum’s persistence
since informed trading increases the transaction costs associated with purchasing past winners
and selling past losers. By increasing the cost of implementing momentum strategies, informed
trading inhibits the ability of arbitrageurs to eliminate momentum.
Determining whether momentum strategies yield abnormal returns after transaction costs
is beyond the scope of this paper since the appropriate methodology for measuring the price-
impact of informed trading is controversial. After estimating a concave price-impact function,
19The cumulative momentum returns in Figure 1, which begin in month t, are not comparable to the β5
coefficients from equation (1) that measure the cross-sectional relationship between holding period returns in
month t and past returns over the month t− 13 to month t− 60 horizon.
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Chen, Stanzl, and Watanabe (2002) conclude that only small amounts can be invested in momen-
tum strategies before their abnormal returns are eliminated. Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou (2003)
also report that momentum returns are insignificant after accounting for transaction costs. In
contrast, Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) employ a linear price-impact function and determine that
large positions can be invested in momentum strategies before their abnormal returns disap-
pear.20
To our knowledge, the existing literature has not explicitly accounted for asymmetric infor-
mation when estimating the transaction costs of momentum strategies. However, Keim (2003)
emphasizes the importance of investment style to institutional transaction costs. Consistent with
momentum’s persistence being attributable to informed trading, Keim (2003) reports that mo-
mentum strategies have higher transaction costs than value strategies and diversified investment
strategies.
VI Conclusions
We document that return continuation is stronger for stocks with higher probabilities of informed
trading. Although greater uncertainty coincides with higher informed trading, the relationship
between return continuation and informed trading is robust to controlling for uncertainty proxies
such as analyst forecast dispersion, analyst coverage, idiosyncratic return volatility, and size. The
influence of informed trading on return continuation also cannot be attributed to cross-sectional
differences in liquidity and order flow imbalances.
Instead, our results indicate that price discovery is responsible for short-term price momen-
tum. In Wang (1994), uninformed investors gradually learn about the private information pos-
sessed by informed investors. Learning causes uninformed investors to update their cashflow
expectations and imitate the earlier trades of informed investors. Thus, when turnover arises
from informed trading, learning generates return continuation. Conversely, turnover that is not
attributable to private information leads to temporary reductions in liquidity that induce subse-
quent return reversals.
20Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) estimate trading costs in-sample over the January 1993 to May 1997 subperiod
before estimating these costs out-of-sample by conditioning on nine firm characteristics. This out-of-sample
estimation of trading costs does not account for time-variation in informed trading.
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As predicted by Wang (1994), stocks with high informed trading and high turnover experience
the strongest return continuation, while stocks with low informed trading and high turnover
experience return reversals. Furthermore, momentum returns are confined to stocks with high
levels of informed trading. Thus, contrary to the underlying motivation for limits to arbitrage,
stronger momentum occurs in stocks with greater informed trading that have lower noise trader
risk.
Our empirical results stress the importance of informed trading to future theoretical and
empirical research on price momentum. One avenue for future research involves a re-evaluation
of the transaction costs incurred by momentum strategies after conditioning on firm-specific
and time-varying measures of informed trading. Prior research has estimated these transaction
costs using firm characteristics such as size that are less important to return continuation than
informed trading at the firm level.
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Panel A: Characteristics of PIN-sorted portfolios
Table I. Characteristics of PIN Portfolios
This table reports the time series averages of firm characteristics across PIN-sorted portfolios and their pairwise correlations. PIN refers to the
probability of informed trading. The sample period is January 1989 to December 2001 for lambda and the effective spread, and January 1983 to
December 2001 for the remaining characteristics. Each year, firms are sorted into five PIN portfolios and the cross-sectional average of each
characteristic is computed within each quintile. The time series averages corresponding to these annual cross-sectional averages are then
reported in Panel A. The price-impact measure lambda and the effective spread are estimated from the TAQ database. Size is the market
capitalization of a firm in millions of dollars. Turnover represents a firm’s monthly turnover ratio divided by the number of its shares outstanding.
IVOL denotes idiosyncratic volatility, computed using each firm’s weekly returns over the past year. The return R2 statistic is estimated by
regressing a firm’s weekly return on the return of the market and its industry over the past year. Analyst dispersion is the standard deviation of
analysts’ earnings forecasts for the next fiscal year divided by the firm’s stock price. Analyst coverage is the number of analysts following a stock.
Panel B reports the average pairwise correlations between these firm characteristics. The correlation coefficients are estimated using monthly
observations.  
PIN Lambda
Effective
Spread Size Turnover IVOL Return R2
Analyst
Dispersion
Analyst
Coverage
P1 0.12 0.76 0.41 6261 0.066 0.045 0.31 0.013 16.6
P2 0.16 1.54 0.61 1485 0.070 0.055 0.24 0.014 10.5
P3 0.20 2.72 0.85 664 0.066 0.063 0.19 0.018 6.9
P4 0.24 4.97 1.09 314 0.055 0.070 0.15 0.035 4.8
P5 0.34 9.45 1.38 151 0.041 0.076 0.12 0.034 3.1
PIN 1.00 0.28 0.46 -0.30 -0.18 0.28 -0.42 0.07 -0.53
Lambda 1.00 0.63 -0.10 -0.14 0.28 -0.24 0.26 -0.29
Effective Spread 1.00 -0.26 -0.10 0.53 -0.45 0.48 -0.51
Size 1.00 -0.01 -0.17 0.36 -0.04 0.54
Turnover 1.00 0.19 0.12 0.04 0.11
IVOL 1.00 -0.29 0.31 -0.32
Return R2 1.00 -0.09 0.60
Analyst Dispersion 1.00 -0.06
Analyst Coverage 1.00
Panel B: Pairwise Pearson Correlations 
β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6 β7 β8
ln(Size) B/M rt-1,t rt-12,t-2 rt-60,t-13 PINt* • rt-12,t-2 Dispt-1 • rt-12,t-2 Lambdat* • rt-12,t-2
1 0.0116 0.0025 -0.0250 0.0063 -0.0005
1.26 1.24 -3.07 2.16 -1.26
2 0.0152 0.0027 -0.0261 -0.0080 -0.0006 0.0895
1 66 1 33 3 20 1 42 1 35 3 60
Model
Specification
Table II. Return Continuation
This table summarizes the estimated coefficients from several nested specifications of the cross-sectional regression in equation (1). The
dependent variable in this regression is the unadjusted return of individual stocks in month t. The independent variables control for size and book-
to-market characteristics, as well as past returns over three non-overlapping horizons with rt-12,t-2  denoting an intermediate horizon that corresponds
to the formation period of momentum strategies. To analyze the role of informed trading, the cross-sectional regression includes up to three
interaction terms between past intermediate returns and PIN, analyst forecast dispersion (Disp), and Kyle (1985)’s lambda. PIN and lambda pertain
to the calendar year t* that contains month t. The second row in bold contains t-statistics for each of the estimated coefficients. 
. . - . - . - . .
3 0.0112 0.0029 -0.0252 0.0054 -0.0005 0.1363
1.22 1.47 -3.05 1.80 -1.15 0.76
4 0.0103 0.0027 -0.0249 0.0058 -0.0005 0.0009
1.12 1.33 -3.04 1.89 -1.18 1.25
5 0.0149 0.0031 -0.0262 -0.0086 -0.0005 0.0895 0.0985
1.63 1.56 -3.18 -1.52 -1.26 3.46 0.54
6 0.0139 0.0029 -0.0262 -0.0084 -0.0006 0.0936 0.0000
1.52 1.39 -3.19 -1.48 -1.29 3.58 -0.07
7 0.0137 0.0033 -0.0263 -0.0093 -0.0005 0.0948 0.1252 -0.0002
1.50 1.63 -3.17 -1.65 -1.20 3.55 0.68 -0.26
β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6
ln(Size) B/M rt-1,t rt-12,t-2 rt-60,t-13 ΔTO • rt-12,t-2
1 0.0073 0.0052 -0.0403 0.0050 0.0001
0.78 1.82 -4.16 1.39 0.25
2 0.0067 0.0050 -0.0430 0.0043 0.0002 -0.0080
0.73 1.77 -4.37 1.16 0.40 -1.63
1 0.0217 0.0059 -0.0414 0.0027 0.0002
Model 
Specification
Table III. PIN, Turnover, and Return Continuation
P1
This table summarizes the relationship between turnover and return continuation across different levels of
informed trading. P1 and P4 denote the low PIN portfolio and high PIN portfolio respectively, with the estimated
coefficients from equation (2) recorded for each PIN quartile. The dependent variable in this regression is the
monthly unadjusted return of individual stocks in month t. The independent variables include size and book-to-
market characteristics, past returns over three non-overlapping horizons, as well as the interaction term between
changes in turnover and past returns over an intermediate horizon from month t-2 to month t-12. The change in
turnover (ΔTO) is defined as turnover in month t-1 minus turnover during this intermediate horizon. Model 1
refers to equation (2) without the ΔTO interaction variable while model 2 includes this interaction variable. The
second row in bold contains t-statistics for each of the estimated coefficients. 
1.92 2.51 -4.35 0.82 0.50
2 0.0202 0.0061 -0.0418 0.0043 0.0003 0.0014
1.80 2.62 -4.42 1.26 0.60 0.38
1 0.0073 0.0034 -0.0267 0.0022 -0.0009
0.66 1.60 -3.23 0.80 -1.58
2 0.0086 0.0036 -0.0272 0.0034 -0.0008 -0.0006
0.78 1.73 -3.27 1.17 -1.42 -0.25
1 0.0114 -0.0002 -0.0115 0.0092 -0.0010
1.34 -0.09 -1.57 4.36 -2.01
2 0.0107 -0.0001 -0.0122 0.0101 -0.0009 0.0049
1.28 -0.04 -1.65 4.66 -1.95 1.65
P4-P1 2 0.0040 -0.0051 0.0308 0.0058 -0.0011 0.0129
0.32 -1.56 3.14 1.59 -1.68 2.24
P3
P4
P2
β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6 β6 β6
ln(Size) B/M rt-1,t rt-12,t-2 rt-60,t-13 RPIN1t • rt-12,t-2 RPIN2t • rt-12,t-2 RPIN3t • rt-12,t-2
1 0.0063 0.0031 -0.0264 0.0056 -0.0006 0.2010
0.68 1.47 -3.18 1.94 -1.27 6.59
Table IV. Residual PIN and Return Continuation
Model
Specification
This table reports the estimated coefficients from the cross-sectional regression in equation (4). Residual probabilities of informed trading (RPIN)
are first obtained as the intercepts and residuals of the cross-sectional regression in equation (3). These residual probabilities are then combined
with past intermediate returns to form interaction variables involving informed trading. The independent variables in equation (4) control for size
and book-to-market characteristics, as well as past returns over three non-overlapping horizons. Three sets of residual PIN estimates are
examined. RPIN1 accounts for the four uncertainty proxies (forecast dispersion, analyst coverage, return R2, and size), while RPIN2 also includes
Kyle (1985)’s lambda and the effective spread. The RPIN3 estimates supplement these uncertainty and liquidity characteristics with the absolute
value of order flow imbalances. The second row in bold contains t-statistics for each of the estimated coefficients. 
2 0.0074 0.0032 -0.0264 0.0052 -0.0006 0.1970
0.79 1.52 -3.18 1.81 -1.25 6.41
3 0.0076 0.0032 -0.0262 0.0052 -0.0005 0.1658
0.81 1.56 -3.16 1.81 -1.22 5.47
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
TO1 0.70% 0.92% 1.02% 1.27% 1.42% 0.72% 2.01 0.71% 1.77
TO2 0.91% 1.07% 1.33% 1.18% 1.67% 0.76% 1.94 1.00% 2.41
TO3 1.27% 1.13% 1.26% 1.44% 1.83% 0.56% 1.35 0.61% 1.34
TO4 1.29% 1.13% 0.95% 1.13% 0.76% -0.54% -1.03 0.13% 0.22
TO1 0.25% 0.89% 0.64% 0.88% 1.30% 1.06% 2.70 1.33% 3.08
TO2 0.34% 1.22% 1.38% 1.13% 1.07% 0.73% 1.75 1.04% 2.26
TO3 1.03% 1.25% 1.50% 1.56% 1.72% 0.69% 1.53 0.86% 1.74
TO4 1.18% 1.66% 1.45% 1.79% 1.62% 0.44% 0.72 1.33% 2.00
TO1 ‐0.18% 0.67% 0.70% 0.36% 0.61% 0.79% 2.08 0.90% 2.13
TO2 0 07% 0 53% 1 24% 1 26% 1 51% 1 45% 3 55 1 31% 2 96
Table V. PIN, Turnover, and Momentum
P2
M5-M1 (t -statistic)
P1
Unadjusted 4-Factor Adjusted
This table reports on the relation between informed trading, turnover and momentum by constructing double-
sorted portfolios. The 12-1-1 momentum strategy is studied. M5 (M1) refers to the portfolio of stocks with the
highest (lowest) past returns. A sequential sorting procedure constructs the double-sorted portfolios by first
sorting stocks according to PIN, then turnover during the last month of the formation period. These double-sorts
examine turnover’s effect on momentum returns across different levels of informed trading. Portfolio returns are
adjusted using the Fama and French (1993) three factors, along with the liquidity factor of Pástor and Stambaugh
(2003).  In addition, t-statistics are reported for the unadjusted returns and the alpha intercepts from the four-
factor model. 
. . . . . . . . .
TO3 0.59% 1.14% 1.13% 1.85% 2.12% 1.53% 3.44 1.30% 2.67
TO4 1.07% 2.00% 2.17% 2.16% 2.70% 1.64% 2.71 2.43% 3.76
TO1 ‐0.65% 0.38% 0.52% 0.80% 0.37% 1.02% 2.58 1.14% 2.59
TO2 ‐0.02% 0.62% 0.69% 0.96% 1.14% 1.16% 3.03 0.83% 1.97
TO3 0.37% 1.34% 1.16% 1.49% 2.36% 1.99% 4.33 1.84% 3.65
TO4 1.73% 2.82% 3.50% 3.22% 4.15% 2.41% 3.66 2.62% 3.57
P3
P4
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
P1 1.24% 1.40% 1.15% 1.31% 1.52% 0.28% 0.78 0.24% 0.62
P2 1.13% 1.06% 1.11% 1.18% 1.47% 0.33% 0.89 0.75% 1.84
P3 0.90% 0.90% 1.15% 1.40% 1.31% 0.41% 1.06 0.77% 1.79
P4 0.86% 1.26% 1.15% 1.22% 1.55% 0.69% 1.73 1.29% 2.96
P5 0.64% 1.36% 1.58% 1.63% 1.83% 1.19% 2.77 1.64% 3.49
Panel A: Sorted on Firm Characteristics, then on PIN
M5-M1 (t -statistic)
Unadjusted 4-Factor Adjusted
Size
Table VI. PIN, Firm Characteristics, and Momentum
This table reports the importance of PIN to price momentum after controlling for uncertainty, liquidity, and order
flow imbalances. The 12-1-1 momentum strategy is studied. The M5 portfolio consists of past winners, while the
M1 portfolio contains past losers. A sequential sorting procedure constructs characteristic-neutralized PIN
portfolios. In Panel A, stocks are first sorted into size portfolios (S1-small to S5-big) according to their market
capitalization. PIN portfolios (PIN1 to PIN5) are then formed within each size portfolio. Size-neutralized PIN
portfolios (P1 to P5) are formed by combining these PIN portfolios within each size portfolio (e.g. P1 combines
PIN1 across each size portfolio). We then replace size with other proxies for uncertainty, liquidity, and the absolute
value of order flow imbalances. Momentum returns are adjusted using the Fama and French (1993) three factors,
along with the liquidity factor of Pástor and Stambaugh (2003).  In addition, t-statistics are reported for the
unadjusted returns and alpha intercepts from the four-factor model. Panel B reports the results from the residual
PIN approach that regresses PIN on multiple uncertainty and illiquidity characteristics as well as the absolute value
of order flow imbalances, as in equation (3). The intercepts and residuals from this regression are referred to as
residual probabilities of informed trading (RPIN). After sorting stocks in RPIN quintiles, momentum returns are
computed for each portfolio. 
P1 1.36% 1.25% 1.09% 1.33% 1.50% 0.15% 0.42 0.28% 0.74
P2 1.07% 1.12% 1.32% 1.24% 1.26% 0.19% 0.50 0.64% 1.59
P3 0.81% 1.08% 1.17% 1.59% 1.63% 0.83% 2.01 1.00% 2.07
P4 0.70% 1.39% 1.41% 1.63% 1.62% 0.92% 2.30 1.15% 2.60
P5 0.63% 1.40% 1.98% 1.87% 2.16% 1.54% 3.73 1.63% 3.60
P1 1.09% 1.20% 1.17% 1.20% 1.26% 0.17% 0.38 0.19% 0.39
P2 0.83% 0.93% 1.01% 0.95% 1.29% 0.46% 1.01 0.66% 1.35
P3 0.83% 1.27% 1.12% 1.30% 1.51% 0.68% 1.27 1.04% 1.82
P4 0.89% 0.80% 1.05% 1.25% 1.79% 0.90% 1.69 1.36% 2.42
P5 0.88% 1.06% 1.67% 1.99% 2.32% 1.44% 2.26 1.90% 2.75
P1 1.12% 1.29% 1.23% 1.42% 1.61% 0.49% 1.25 0.52% 1.26
P2 1.05% 0.93% 0.96% 1.22% 1.37% 0.32% 0.65 0.67% 1.29
P3 0.41% 0.88% 1.23% 1.10% 1.24% 0.83% 1.64 1.25% 2.29
P4 0.60% 1.00% 1.27% 1.38% 1.50% 0.91% 1.91 0.94% 1.88
P5 0.20% 1.23% 1.59% 1.47% 2.22% 2.02% 4.00 1.92% 3.59
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
0.91% 1.01% 1.18% 1.04% 1.12% 0.21% 0.46 0.32% 0.66
0.87% 1.03% 0.99% 1.34% 1.30% 0.44% 1.15 0.57% 1.43
0.97% 1.10% 1.21% 1.22% 1.44% 0.46% 1.05 0.66% 1.42
0.84% 1.33% 1.01% 1.26% 1.74% 0.90% 1.85 1.12% 2.04
0.52% 0.90% 1.30% 1.47% 1.62% 1.09% 1.90 1.29% 2.22
RP4
RP5
DISP
RP2
RP3
RP1
Unadjusted 4-Factor Adjusted
M5-M1 (t -statistic)
Lambda
ABS(OIB)
Panel B: Sorted on Residual PIN
β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6 β7
ln(Size) B/M rt-1,t rt-12,t-2 rt-60,t-13 PINt*-1 • rt-12,t-2 PINt* • rt-12,t-2
1 0.0098 0.0026 -0.0242 0.0081 -0.0006 0.0026
1.09 1.29 -2.98 1.43 -1.43 0.12
Table VII. Prior PIN
Panel A: Prior PIN and Momentum
Model
Specification
A firm’s prior PIN estimate denoted PINt*-1 is defined as its calendar year PIN prior to the PINt* estimate in month t. Panel A contains the results
from the cross-sectional regression in equation (1) using PINt*-1, interacted with past intermediate returns, as well as the original interaction
variable defined by PINt*. The intermediate past return horizon from month t-12 to month t-2 corresponds to the formation period of momentum
strategies. The second row in bold contains t-statistics for each of the estimated coefficients. Momentum returns from a 12-1-1 momentum
strategy are examined in Panel B across prior PIN quintiles.  M5 refers to the portfolio of past winners while M1refers to the portfolio of past
losers.  Momentum returns are also reported for double-sorted portfolios that first sort stocks into size quintiles, then PIN quintiles (as in Table
VI). 
2 0.0128 0.0028 -0.0257 -0.0026 -0.0006 -0.0600 0.1272
1.42 1.38 -3.18 -0.40 -1.48 -2.48 4.79
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
P1 1.19% 1.15% 1.17% 1.26% 1.59% 0.40% 1.08
P2 0.94% 0.94% 1.16% 1.33% 1.36% 0.42% 1.13
P3 0.52% 0.84% 1.25% 1.55% 1.34% 0.82% 2.04
P4 0.66% 1.25% 1.09% 1.21% 1.57% 0.91% 2.37
P5 0.27% 1.10% 1.37% 1.17% 1.16% 0.89% 2.18
P1 1.25% 1.10% 1.15% 1.25% 1.50% 0.25% 0.67
P2 1.07% 1.27% 1.11% 1.31% 1.66% 0.59% 1.47
P3 0.81% 1.08% 1.32% 1.28% 1.57% 0.76% 1.90
P4 0.87% 1.00% 1.12% 1.24% 1.46% 0.60% 1.55
P5 0.62% 0.90% 1.22% 1.49% 1.16% 0.54% 1.30
PIN
Size-
Neutralized 
PIN
Panel B: Size, Prior PIN, and Momentum
M5-M1 (t -statistic)
Unadjusted Returns
Figure 1. PIN and Long-Term Cumulative Momentum Returns
This figure plots the long-term cumulative value-weighted returns from the 12-1-1 momentum strategy (M5-
M1) for each PIN portfolio over the holding period from month t+1 to month t+60. The x-axis represents the 
post-formation period (in months), while the y-axis displays the cumulative value-weighted return. 
